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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a hypothesis about how social interactions shape and influence predictive
processing in the brain. The paper integrates concepts from neuroscience and sociology where a
gulf presently exists between the ways that each describe the same phenomenon – how the
social world is engaged with by thinking humans. We combine the concepts of predictive
processing models (also called predictive coding models in the neuroscience literature) with
ideal types, typifications and social practice – concepts from the sociological literature. This
generates a unified hypothetical framework integrating the social world and hypothesised
brain processes. The hypothesis combines aspects of neuroscience and psychology with social
theory to show how social behaviors may be “mapped” onto brain processes. It outlines a
conceptual framework that connects the two disciplines and that may enable creative dialogue
and potential future research.
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Introduction
We argue that two social processes play an important part
in prediction-based inference in the human brain. First,
physical interaction between individuals and between indi-
viduals and their physical and biological environment has
to happen. Second, humans have to exercise their capacity
to share their subjectivity with others – intersubjectivity
(Kelly & Kelly, 2018). Predictive processing is the computa-
tional process by which a brain can model its external
world and its internal feeling state; it makes inferences
about the causes of the inputs it receives. Those predictive
processes include ideal types and typifications arising in
the social practices of everyday life. We show how the
prediction-based generative modelling, that has been
described by neuroscientists (Clark, 2016; Frith, 2007;
Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2015; Seth, 2015) is linked
through the concept of the self to ideal types, typifications
and social practices, concepts which have been defined by
sociologists (Giddens, 1979, 1982, 1984; Mead, 1934;
Schutz, 1964, 1970; Shove, Pantzar, & Watson, 2012;
Weber, 1949).
The brain as a model of the world
We begin with an account of the processes occurring
within the individual brain and then go on to consider
the interactions between the brain and the external
social environment. Our initial proposition is that the
brain is a model of the external world (cf Conant &
Ashby, 1970). The concept of the brain as a model of
the world (Frith, 2007), and the associated idea of pre-
dictive processing are based on the principle that the
brain develops its model of the world by engaging in
generative modelling – reasoning backwards from
sense data to infer what external events and stimuli
are most likely to have caused these sense data. It
does this on the basis of a priori models (Clark, 2016;
Frith, 2007; Pezzulo et al., 2015; Seth, 2015). Ideal types
and typifications formed in social interaction are intrin-
sic to those a priori models because they help encode
some sense data. We focus therefore below on the
social interaction between the person and their external
environment, and the resulting generative modelling
The world is a changeable place. Both automatic and
planned actions (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) take advan-
tage of and mitigate the impact of potentially harmful
changes in the external environment. This allows for the
exertion of some degree of control over the factors that
could threaten organism stability. In anticipating these
changes and reacting to them, the brain works as a
regulatory system which acts by making a model of its
world (Conant & Ashby, 1970). A key, and long-standing
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question in neuroscience is how can it do this when the
signals it receives from that world are noisy, inconsis-
tent and ambiguous? One answer is that it deals with
the noise and ambiguity through predictive processing.
This means that it uses prior knowledge to interpret
these signals in order to infer the most likely causes of
the inputs. Such a system requires experience and sen-
sory input as well as, crucially, a capacity to integrate
the two in pursuit of optimal modelling. Incoming evi-
dence and other signals that do not accord with current
expectations will produce a prediction error. The error
in turn can form the basis for updating the model (Frith,
2007: 134–6). Alternatively the prediction error may be
ignored especially if it is weak or unreliable. If updating
occurs, the next set of predictions are based on that
updated model (Clark, 2016:13–52).
A central problem for the inferring brain is that it
does not have direct contact with the causes of sensory
inputs in its world. It has only all the various ambiguous
signals, both internal to the body (e.g. blood pressure,
heart rate) and external to the body (e.g. vision, sound,
touch). Its solution is to make generative inferences (i.e.
to infer the causes of those inputs) and by predictive
processing to use these as the basis for predicting
future inputs. The central idea of predictive processing
is that in order to make sense of ambiguous noisy
inputs, the brain makes use of predictions based on
prior experience. But predictions can be inaccurate,
producing prediction errors. A policy of minimising
such errors should therefore ensure optimal future
inferences in a changing world. However, given that
some degree of inaccuracy of prediction error is inevi-
table, the dilemma arises over when to update in
response to errors and when to ignore them. We
develop this idea below.
Our conscious experience of the world, therefore, is
largely a prediction of what is about to happen next or,
more accurately, what the next inputs are likely to be
(Clark, 2016: 168–71; cf Schutz, 1970:67). This not only
works for interpreting incoming data but it also drives
actions and movements. So future motor intentions are
also subject to future predictions. Thus, an action
becomes something that occurs to fulfil the prediction
that happens as a consequence of having a motor
intention (Frith, 2007:106). That is, we can view actions
as occurring in response to the mismatch between
current state and motor prediction. As such an action
can be conceived as occurring to minimise a prediction
error. This perspective has been extended to a consid-
eration of emotion and feeling as arising from similarly
prediction-based inference about bodily states from an
array of internal signals (Seth & Critchley, 2013). The
predictive framework offers an integrated perspective
on action, perception, emotion and cognition (Clark,
2016: 4–7; 68–9). Consideration of all these ideas in
detail is beyond the scope of this paper and we focus
primarily on their implications for social interactions
and inferences.
The critical point in respect of social interaction is
that humans are able to do much more than predict
their immediate movements and actions. They can pre-
dict and imagine their own and others’ future and past
actions and intentions too. The machinery for predic-
tion that subserves perception and controls actions of
the individual extends to anticipating and interpreting
other people’s actions (Clark, 2016: 139–151; cf Mead,
1934:147–159). So at the same time as the human can
predict their own simple movements, like waving a
hand or bending a finger, they can simultaneously
engage with a cultural universe with a past, a present
and an anticipated future. They can also anticipate the
actions of other people and things, not only in their
present purview, (the people and things that they can
see in their immediate fields of vision and experience)
but they can anticipate and reason about social and
cultural worlds past, present and future (Zerubavel,
1997:7). They have a highly developed awareness of
themselves in relation to those worlds.
Active inference is the minimisation of prediction
errors through performing actions in the service of
intentions (Seth, 2015: 18–19). The essence of active
inference is that movements/actions are generated by
prediction errors (a mismatch between intention and
experience). They are performed in the service of inten-
tions that aim at minimising those prediction errors.
Consequently the action does not seek to disconfirm
but rather attempts to confirm the current prediction
(the intention). As well as physical movements, these
inferences drive physical and symbolic (i.e. imaginative)
interaction with others (cf Blumer, 1962). Active infer-
ence is the combined mechanism by which perceptual
and motor systems work together to reduce prediction
error using the twin strategies of altering predictions to
fit the world and altering the world to fit predictions
(Clark, 2016: 122). In other words, individuals act on the
world to make their model reality; they are not just
passive subjects being acted on or determined by the
world
Good inferences will make better predictions and so
prediction error becomes a valuable marker for the
validity of the current model as well as an important
drive to model updating. Not all brains accomplish this
optimally and as we argue below, the capacity to opti-
mise updating is differentially distributed across the
population. Through the iterative process of inferring,
predicting, error-monitoring and updating, the brain’s
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model is developed and each individual will create
models differently. Given that different individuals cre-
ate models that are distinct from one another, the
individual brain faces two immediate tasks; the first is
to orient its own behavior in line with its developing
model and the second is to ascertain the degree to
which its models of the world align with those of others
in its immediate and wider environments. So at once,
there is both a neuroscientific computational intra-
individual problem and a problem that has to be solved
inter-subjectively in order for social interaction to pro-
ceed. The latter is accomplished in part through the
processes of socialisation from infancy through child-
hood and continuing into adult life, which in turn inter-
act with the neuroscientific processes. It is also in part
facilitated through the use of ideal types and typifica-
tions which we describe below.
For the computational neuroscientific problem, at its
simplest, the brain has to focus on minimising predic-
tion error for the best possible model to emerge. But
prediction errors are inevitable since the senses are
limited, models are always simplifications and since
the world is noisy, uncertain and changing. Humans
need a means to deal with this. The question of when
to update in response to prediction error and when to
ignore this error and retain previous inferences is there-
fore critical. If the model does not align with new
information, the organism finds itself maladapted to
its environment (Pezzulo et al., 2015), but if it updates
too readily it will over-fit the data and miss statistical
regularities that are important and real, albeit probabil-
istic. The problem is one that attends any modelling
enterprise: the model must be a pragmatic simplifica-
tion and so is inevitably partly wrong (Clark, 2016:
69–71) but it can be rectified. An unexpected response
can signal that the prediction is wrong but does not
necessarily signal that it would be optimal to change or
fix it (Fletcher & Frith, 2009).
In summary, the brain may be considered a predictive
inference device, integrating both external and internal
signals with prior knowledge in order to infer the likely
causes of those signals and thereby to model, and ulti-
mately regulate, the world. Prior experience helps to
stabilise error response. Prima facie, this is a reductionist
perspective, but actually this model puts a powerful
emphasis on the environment and the social, as well as
the individual, as facilitators of brain processes (Franks,
2010:, 2010: 59). In recognising that the brain functions
as a model of the world, we are acknowledging that
brain processes may be understood in the context of
the world that the brain inhabits; its body and the
world beyond. The predictive processing model there-
fore demands conceptualisations of the brain at levels
that go beyond the neurobiological and cognitive to the
social (cf Franks, 2010: 39). We next elucidate the nature
of the interaction between the self and the external
environment.
The self
For Seth the self is the critical locus of the interaction
between the brain and the social world (Seth, 2015). We
concur. Our conception follows Kant who described the
self in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1781/1787/
2007) (pre-figuring predictive processing) by arguing
that humans make judgements in order to make
sense of the world. They do this on the basis both of
empirical sense data and a priori categories derived
from previous experience (cf Zerubavel, 1997: 2–5).
Kant also identified the self as the place where such
judgements are made (cf Frith, 2007:138). Historically
these Kantian ideas were central to the conceptions of
self, which were developed in the philosophy and social
psychology of William James (1892) and George
Herbert Mead (1934), in the phenomenological writings
of Alfred Schutz (Schutz, 1964:20) and in sociology in
symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1962; Stone &
Farberman, 1981). We draw on these insights to
develop our account.
We conceptualise the self as a thinking subject, who
knows that they are thinking, who can reflect, ruminate
and act on the external world and is aware of their
capacities for reflexivity and agency. That external
world is an empirical totality of potential sensory inputs
(Kelly, 2015). The self is the conscious awareness of the
process of actively interpreting external and internal
information and stimuli. In doing so it conceives of itself
as a subject separate from the physical external world
and from other people and as existing through time
and being situated in place. It is able to think of its self
as a self-directing agent – an “I” – with an autobiogra-
phy expressed in the language forms “I do”, “I will do”,
“I can do”, “I have done” and so on. The self and the “I”
enable predictive processing to move from being about
simple motor responses and intention to engaging with
the broader social and cultural universe. That self is the
centre of its own experiences of that cultural universe.
The brain predictively processes external inputs and
internal subjective experience consisting of the experi-
ence of the body (Seth, 2015:9–10) and of conscious-
ness, in order to maintain homeostasis. The experience
of the body, of one’s consciousness and of being in the
wider world are the platforms on which the social self
develops. The self is social because it arises and devel-
ops in social interaction (Mead, 1934). It is only possible
to have a self if one has experience of interaction with
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others – it is quintessentially relational. The self has a
dual aspect. First, it is substantial and experienced as
something unitary across place and time in the sense
that “I am the same person I was yesterday, last week,
last year or when I was a child”. Second, it is also
situational and experienced as something in the here
and now intrinsically linked to current and immediate
actions and roles, say managing the acute pain I am
currently suffering or concentrating on the book I am
reading at the moment. These second multiple situa-
tional aspects of self may be experienced as dissociated
or partly disconnected from my experience of other
situational selves – the self I was before I was in pain
or when I was eating my breakfast earlier this morning.
They may also be experienced as if they disjoined from
the substantial idea of self (Kelly, 1992; Kelly &
Dickinson, 1997; Turner, 1968). Both aspects of self –
the substantial and situated – arise in relational inter-
active processes. Both are experienced as something
unique to the isolated individual and linked to the
individual’s body. Given that the brain’s access to its
own body is, just as with external stimuli, noisy and
ambiguous, the way that the body is experienced and
the arising sense of self depends on the brain’s infer-
ence of what the causes of the internal and external
sensory signals it is experiencing are most likely to be
(Seth, 2015:11; Frith, 2007:126–7).
Social life
Echoing Mead and Schutz and linking to more recent
social theory (Giddens, 1979, 1982, 1984) we suggest
that the interfaces between the brain, the self and
society and the intra-individual nature of the neuros-
cientific processes described above and the develop-
ment of self may be understood as follows. Human
social life – society – has two characteristics. First, it
changes continuously, sometimes very gradually, some-
times seismically. Second, it also has a repetitive and
recursive quality (Giddens, 1984: xxiii, 17–19). Most peo-
ple most of the time engage in more or less the same
activities and practices on a day-to-day basis. Therefore
much human activity can be, in Schutz’s words, “taken
for granted” (Schutz, 1970: 79–80; cf Clark, 2016: 54–8)
and therefore successfully accomplished without the
human having to do much other than go with the
flow of interaction and engage in habitual activities
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004; : Kahneman, 2011). Extant
brain models work well in these circumstances because
this repetitive and recursive social reality requires only
minimal model adjustments. Predictions work accu-
rately enough most of the time; prediction error is
marginal and therefore the models need only slight
updating. Not much is required internally by way of
remodelling the external world and the prior predictive
models do not need to be fundamentally changed.
Human life as well as being recursive and repetitive,
also throws up considerable novel challenges.
Challenges arise because the signals from the external
environment are ambiguous, unclear or discordant
from the perspective of the brain’s existing model of
the world. As noted above, no model can be unerringly
accurate in its predictions. Therefore, when the signals
do not align with the models especially when they are
highly discordant, the brain has to engage in significant
reflective remodelling. However, and this is fundamen-
tally important, this does not cause most people much
distress or difficulty most of the time; embarrassing as it
is, making faux pas during social interaction and cor-
recting behavior for the future, is commonplace, normal
and routine. Moreover most adult humans most of the
time are highly adept in social interaction at knowing
when to overlook or ignore the faux pas of others in
order to allow interaction to proceed smoothly (cf
Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1969). The processes of
adjustment happen quickly. Even where the signals
require active cognitive engagement most people, at
least by the time they reach their teens, are very skilled
at adjusting their predictive models to such an extent
they may not even consciously acknowledge that it has
happened. They also can comfortably hold differing
models as workable at the same time (Festinger, 1957).
New and unfamiliar circumstances or environments,
major life changes, events and experiences and the
emotional and hormonal reactions to the unfamiliar or
to the changes themselves also present challenges to
the brain. In adjusting to major challenges two things
happen germane to our argument. First, the excretion
of stress hormones such as cortisol – there is a physical
reaction with physiological consequences which are
signals to the brain. Second, humans exhibit enormous
capacity to adjust, adapt and cope with such challenges
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and part of that process
involves the remodelling by the brain.
Ideal types and typifications
There are two aspects of the way that people navigate
and make sense of the web of recursive and familiar
and the novel and challenging social practices which
they encounter. First, humans draw upon stocks of
knowledge – priors- from past social experience or
acquired vicariously by listening to and hearing what
other people say and describe, and via access to media
in all its forms (Di Maggio, 1997: 267). Second, in mak-
ing sense of their stocks of knowledge and new stimuli,
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humans use what Schutz called ideal types and typifi-
cations to build new models or to redesign old models.
In the course of daily life, people access the stocks of
knowledge that they have to hand. These serve as a
framework of interpretation of past and present experi-
ence and anticipation of things to come (Schutz,
1970:74). Some of this knowledge is clear and consis-
tent (albeit provisional and sometimes wrong). Some is
vague, obscure and ambiguous (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974: 74). Knowledge is not homogeneous; it tends to
be incoherent, partially clear and certainly not free from
contradictions (Schutz, 1970: 75). Using ideal types
helps solve this problem.
Ideal types are based on idealised notions of what is
out there in the external world. Ideal types consist of
generalized assumptions about how the world is and
how it works. Ideal types are high level organizing
priors which are revised and refined based on experi-
ence, direct or indirect (Schutz, 1967: 185). Ideal types
function as grand schematic priors and allow us broadly
to categorise and organise the multiplicity of ambigu-
ous stimuli, which surround us. Typifications are derived
from these and are used to interpret that which we see
against ideal notions of what we expect the world to be
like (cf Weber, 1949). Typifications, which are plastic,
arise in intersubjective interaction and provide the
basis for signalling internally to the brain (cf Di
Maggio, 1997: 267, 276; Rosch, 1978).
So in order to understand the world of immediate
and vicarious experience humans begin by using ideal
types (Schutz, 1967:184). Ideal types do not necessarily
exist in reality; rather they are a convenient inter-
subjectively shared way of imagining and then begin-
ning the process of organising complex observations
quickly before typifications are engaged to refine
understanding progressively. Transforming ideal types
into typifications involves regressive inference – reason-
ing backwards from the sense data. The grand prior or
schematic is the generalised ideal type which allows us
to work backwards and top down in the typification
process to understand with greater precision what we
think we are observing (Schutz, 1967:191). Typifications
allow for the development of precision to match obser-
vation. We inhabit a world of typical objects and prac-
tices because of the recursive and repetitive nature of
human life. So roles, statuses, situations, institutions are
all experienced as typifications (Schutz, 1970: 118–9)
and the general principles are contained in ideal types
of these typical things. Typifications are an assemblage
of the elements to develop the building blocks of brain
models. The higher-level ideal types help to direct one
to the lower level detailed typifications. Typifications
are used to and evolve as the person makes sense of
complex/ambiguous inputs. They arise in the course of
social interaction and they act as the medium through
which signals are encoded. The typifications are aspects
of external and internal world, which the brain uses; the
typifications generated by the self are a microcosm of
the macrocosm – the wider world (Shalin, 1984: 43).
Typifications are the way in which we bridge the gap
between what we observe and our past knowledge and
expectations, they are the basis of the way we make
judgements, how we draw together ideas and experi-
ence and so they are the basis of predictive processing
(cf Schutz, 1970:274–5).
Typifications are not fixed. They are malleable and
can be adjusted quickly as the need arises. They can
evolve on the basis of new information and provide the
means of organising phenomena in the external envir-
onment as they appear to be (rather than as they really
are) that is good enough most of the time to ensure, for
most people most of the time, that interaction with
others and the physical environment can proceed rea-
sonably satisfactorily. So typifications are not coherent
realist ontologies (Arp, Smith, & Spear, 2015). They are
akin to Bayesian predictive tools having varying
degrees of correspondence with the external world.
They are like islands of meaning (Zerubavel, 1996) that
group perceptions of stimuli in the external environ-
ment in ways that make sense to the individual and in
ways that accord with taken for granted expectations.
Using typifications is an interactive process occurring in
the immediate present. But it also has to reference past
interactions (Schutz, 1970: 218–9). Typifications emerge
because of linguistic and communicative exchanges
between people and the mutual understandings
between them – their intersubjectivity (Schutz, 1967:
10; cf Frith, 2007:139–40).
Ideal types and typifications are used for the prag-
matic simplification of complex social life (Di Maggio,
1997:269) and physical and biological environments
and are generated neurologically in the same way
that all predictive modelling takes place. They are
used to solve complex problems in the social, physical
and biological environments and to engage in the cul-
tural milieu in which all humans are enmeshed.
Typifications help to manage ambiguity and the noise
manifest in those webs and are intrinsic to social inter-
action. The empirical world is highly variegated and
complex. There is always more in the empirical universe
relevant to the organism than is in the orbit of immedi-
ate perception or attention and which will need to be
brought into play in order to adjust prior expectations.
The brain has to take account of these counterfactuals
as well as to make sense of ambiguous and less –
ambiguous signals (Seth, 2015). In short, it needs to
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be both parsimonious and integrative. Typifications are
used to achieve this. Typifications help to resist the
possibility, and then to minimise the disruptive effects,
of external perturbations or signals (Pezzulo et al.,
2015:1). The typifications may be thought of as func-
tioning as priors derived from social experience (Schutz,
1970: 118–9) used to make sense of and interpret
things – people and objects- around us. They are pre-
formed but malleable priors, expectations and predic-
tions derived from ideal types used for developing
generative models for predictive processing in the
social realm (cf Clark, 2016: 13–29). Inter-individual
and supra-individual functioning interact with intra-
individual brain processes and, in so doing, models of
the external world are developed. The social processes
occurring between individuals form a critical substrate
for predictive processing.
Typifications and ideal types help to integrate our
a priori stocks of knowledge about how we anticipate
the world will be. They use past experience, vicarious
understandings and narrative forms embedded in lit-
erature, art, medicine, science, culture, media and reli-
gion (Burke, 1937; Zerubavel, 1997: 68–80; cf Clark,
2016:286) as well as the ongoing experience of social
practices where typifications are utilised, modified and
developed in the webs of interaction of everyday life.
Social practices are fluent sets of repeated behaviors
flowing across groups of people over time (see below).
In the social practices of everyday life, people use ideal
types and typifications to make sense of their own and
others’ conduct as well as the physical and biological
environments in which social practices occur (cf Turner,
2013: 121). Typifications are thus examples of genera-
tive models that arise in the social practices of everyday
life. Typifications, arising in the networks of social prac-
tices link directly to aspects of predictive processing.
Socialisation, which means being recruited into
social practices and learning how to execute them
competently, is how humans “learn” certain priors
about the world, as well as ways of interpreting their
own experience. There are shared understandings,
which are passed on to the next generation through
socialization in education, in families, peer groups,
occupational settings and so on. Humans exist in a
relational universe in the sense that they exist in net-
works of relations with other humans and their sense of
self, their identity, their social roles and all the things
they do – their practices – arise in and are a conse-
quence of relationships. To enact relationships requires,
amongst other things, that the person makes judge-
ments about others; about what they are doing, what
they might be thinking, and what they are going to do
next and in the future, and, counterfactually what they
conceivably could have done or might do in the future,
differently (Blumer, 1962). Some judgements are made
very quickly drawing on heuristics and taken for
granted notions (Kahneman, 2011: 21–28). Other judge-
ments are more drawn out and systematically evalua-
tive. Nevertheless, in each case typifications are used to
make the judgements and to resolve uncertainty. The
human ability to anticipate and interpret the actions of
others as a means of facilitating social interaction has
been a long-standing interest in social theory (Mead,
1934; Blumer, 1962; Schutz, 1964, 1967, 1970; cf Frith,
2007: 193). The practical consequences of the ability to
interpret and anticipate the actions of others is central
to the glue that holds social arrangements together
(Garfinkel, 1967; Giddens, 1979, 1982, 1984; Goffman,
1963, 1969).
Clark (2013) describing models in the brain, distin-
guishes between top-level more cognitive models
which correspond intuitively to increasingly abstract
conceptions of the world (which we have called here
ideal types) and which depend on regularities within
large temporal spatial scales from perceptual lower-
level models which are based on specific kinds of per-
ceptual contact (Clark, 2013: 186) which include typifi-
cations. Ideal types and typifications are not only
cognitive they are social and where the coalescence
between the predictive processing of neuroscience
and typifications arising in social practices occurs and
the ability to operate in basic motor ways is combined
with complex cultural engagement.
It is helpful not to conceive of models in a binary
way as either fitting or not fitting the external data. It is
more appropriate to think of them as existing on a
spectrum of good fit to poor fit with their plasticity
allowing reformulation to occur. Humans vary in their
capacity to use models, to model experience and to
update their models. This is because all models are
wrong, but as Box observed, some are more useful
than others (Box, 1979). The ability to determine
which and how useful the models are, is especially
pertinent because this frames when people are able
to update models in response to prediction errors and
when not to. So individual brains model the external
world differently although the processes of modelling
are very similar. It is not helpful to think of human
actions in binary terms either, as being completely
automatic and lacking in any cognitive engagement
or as fully reflective and conscious (Di Maggio, 1997:
271). Instead, it is highly likely that actions exist on a
spectrum from those, which are largely automatic to
those that are largely reflective with many being a mix
of automatic and reflective processing. Their placement
on the spectrum will depend on the social context (its
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recursive or changeable quality), the action itself (habi-
tual or novel), intention, and the level at which the
predictive processing takes place (whether mostly phy-
siological or mostly social).
Society and social practices
Typifications and ideal types are intrinsic to social life
itself and in the routines and social practices in which
people engage everyday of their lives. We suggest that
humans are volitional; they are agents of their own
actions or at least their sense of self is such that it
produces the impression that they are agents of their
own destiny (Frith, 2007: 152–5). Obviously, people
make many choices and decide to do all sort of things
as they go about their daily lives. Some such decisions
are trivial; others will be highly momentous. Some will
involve detailed cognitive inference others will be
hardly noticed because we do them out of habit or
apparently automatically (Strack & Deutsch, 2004;
D’Andrade, 1995; Di Maggio, 1997: 296). But if we
scale up the trillions and trillions of individual choices
and actions that are going in the human world all of the
time, what we see is that recursive patterns – practices –
emerge (Giddens, 1984: 2–19). Certain things happen
repeatedly at the level of the social. Certain patterns of
human conduct have in other words, a supra-individual
relational quality – which sociologists sometimes refer
to as social structure. The interaction between indivi-
dual actions or agency and the social structures pro-
duced by agency in turn constrains and delimits in
various ways, individual actions and choices in the
practices in which they engage.
Emerging out of the interaction between human
agency and social structure are social practices – recur-
sive and repetitive patterns of human conduct which
exist above and beyond the individual but to which
individuals are recruited, participate in for a while and
then leave, while other individuals take over the prac-
tice, as they in turn are recruited (Shove et al., 2012).
Social practices are the interactions within the webs of
the material and social structures in which human life
occurs (cf Clark, 2016: xvi; Shove et al., 2012) operating
at the supra individual level and from which predictive
processing flows via the typification process (cf Clark,
2016: 269–76). Some practices are intrinsic to human
life like eating, drinking and sexual activity. Some are
intrinsic but take on a great many different forms like
human work and labour. Still others are historically
specific like smoking, enjoying jazz, driving automobiles
or using a stone axe, a bow and arrow or a cell phone.
Some reflect fashion and changing cultural forms.
However, regardless of the practice, in order to engage
successfully in a practice, whatever it is, certain materi-
als and object are required and have to be understood
and recognised as such. So certain tools, certain com-
petencies and understanding of shared meanings asso-
ciated with the practices are always necessary (Shove
et al., 2012). These are reproduced through the practice
itself and in the ways that people talk, think about it,
and execute it.
This talk, action and reflection generate the ideal
types and typifications, which in turn do two things
pertinent to predictive processing. First, they provide a
multitude of inputs and signals themselves; second,
they provide the raw material for the models – they
are the architecture of mind. The typifications arise
because of engagement in social practices and are in
turn the basis for predictive processing. Clark argues
that
“The basic organizing principles highlighted by action-
oriented predictive processing make us superbly sensi-
tive to the structure and statistics of the training envir-
onment. But our human training environments are now
so thoroughly artificial, and our explicit forms of rea-
soning so deeply infected by various forms of external
symbolic scaffolding, that understanding distinctively
human cognition demands a multiply hybrid approach.
Such an approach would combine the deep computa-
tional insights coming from probabilistic generative
approaches (among which figure action-oriented pre-
dictive processing) with solid neuroscientific conjecture
and with a full appreciation of the way our many self-
structured environments alter and transform the pro-
blem spaces of human reason” (Clark, 2013: 201).
Typifications are the way that the external symbolic
scaffolding is made sense of at the social level.
A helpful way to conceptualise the linkage between
the neuroscience and the sociology is the concept of
the lifeworld. In the phenomenological writings of
Schutz (Schutz, 1970: 72–75) the lifeworld is defined
as a subjective cognitive space in which the “I” makes
sense of the world, renders it meaningful, experiences it
through its sense of self in the external environment
and shares its subjectivity with others. The things in the
here and now and of the moment constitute the inner-
most zones of relevance of the lifeworld. The innermost
zones are surrounded by a series of decreasingly rele-
vant things and people. These may be thought of as a
series of concentric rings around the subjective self.
Think of these rings of relevance as occupying, meta-
phorically, a lateral plane. Then conceptualise the gen-
erative models described by the neuroscience as
occupying a vertical plane crossing in the lifeworld.
The higher level models operate at the social level
and are derived from the social practices in which the
person engages. The lower level models are those
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 7
which are shaped by the physiological features of the
brain’s biology.
While Sociology, with some notable exceptions (Di
Maggio, 1997; Franks, 2010; Franks & Turner, 2013;
Zerubavel, 1997), has paid relatively scant attention in
recent years to the brain, in contrast sociologists have
enthusiastically examined the relationship between the
body and society (Freund, 1988; Nettleton & Watson,
1998; Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1992). This has produced
vibrant empirical and theoretical scholarship which
most recently has turned its attention to the embodi-
ment of the social through metabolomic and epigenetic
mechanisms (Landecker & Panofsky, 2013). In this paper
we are interested in the embodiment of the cognitive
through social processes. We have suggested that the
neurological processes described by Seth (2015),
Pezzulo et al. (2015), Frith (2007) and Clark (2016)
amongst others, while quintessentially physiological
are embodied in social interaction through the medium
of the self. We suggest that the self is in turn social and
the locus of experience of the body. Our argument
flows from the pragmatist tradition which sought to
dissolve the boundaries between organism and envir-
onment, mind and body, and individual and society
(Franks & Turner, 2013:142). Like the pragmatists we
hypothesise a transactional and relational process invol-
ving separate analytic categories but synthesised in an
holistic process.
We are not the first to note the potential common-
ality between neuro-science and sociology. Others have
observed that the writings of Mead (1934), Schutz
(1964, 1967, 1970), Blumer (1962), Goffman (1969) and
Ralph Turner (1968) speak directly to the core issues of
the relationship between the brain and the social world
(Franks, 2010: 1–2; Franks & Turner, 2013: 29; Shook,
2013: 37–80). In particular the question of intersubjec-
tivity, or in the contemporary neuroscience idiom the
theory of mind (Hopcroft, 2013: 231), the importance of
the ability to think about what is in other people’s
minds is the very basis of human social and mental
life. Mead himself clearly recognised that this was a
physiological and neurological process as well as a
social one (Franks, 2010: Franks & Turner, 2013:
141–2). The sociological contributions of Mead, Schutz
and Blumer have on the whole been overlooked by
neuroscientists (Turner, 2013) while at the same time
sociologists have tended to keep their distance from
the supposed reductionism of the cognitive and neuro
sciences (Di Maggio, 1997: 264; Von Scheve, 2011:
255–6). However, several contemporary writers see the
opportunity for consilience between sociology and
neuro science partly because of the importance of the
sociological ideas discussed in this paper but also
because, as Di Maggio and Franks and Turner have
observed, some cognitive scientists have come to see
culture and cognition as supra individual and non-
reductionist (Franks, 2010: 2; Von Scheve, 2011: 266–7;
Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2013). Our paper is in that spirit
of consilience.
Implications for power and equity
The idea of predictive processing and of the brain as a
model of the world is we suggest highly relevant to
issues of inequity and power in social systems.
Although the physiology of the brain and predictive
processing are universal features of the species, the
social environments and the networks of social prac-
tices in which people live are certainly not universal;
they are highly variegated. Therefore, the higher level
modelling processes will not be universal either. Social
environments are heterogeneous and social actors
engage not only in differing practices, but the practices
taking place in different lifeworlds are constrained by
class, age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and
geography. These different axes of social difference
intersect with each other to create the rich and
nuanced web of social life in any given society or
culture. The multiplicity of intersections means that
the typifications that people habitually use will be
very variable according to the complex networks of
power, discrimination, disadvantage (or their opposites)
which they experience in their lifeworlds. Given the
variegated nature of the social world, it seems highly
probable that the types of ways in which these social
networks constrain predictive processing will also be
variable in ways that will reinforce current and habitu-
ated patterns of advantage and disadvantage. Ways of
thinking constrain ways of living and acting and clearly
as decades of research in health, educational, class,
gender and ethnic inequalities attest, people’s ability
to operate to their own advantage is more optimal for
some than for others. The ways that poverty and dis-
advantage may impinge on executive functioning is
suggested by our hypothesis (Marteau & Hall, 2013).
Social inequalities are crystallised and then reinforced
in the models of the world people use to make sense of
it and so to act upon it.
Beyond the impact of class, gender, age and ethni-
city and power and discrimination the ways that brain
trauma affects cognition and emotion may also be
understood by the processes we have outlined. The
typifications become distorted, the links between
ideal types and typifications are broken with the con-
sequent impact on social action and the ability to
participate routinely in social practices gets disrupted
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in various ways (Damasio, 1994). Likewise addictive
behaviors as well as the behavioral and linguistic
consequences of intoxication may be illuminated by
thinking about the typification processes embedded
in social practices. Some forms of psychiatric morbid-
ity (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Clark, 2016: 73–79) are also
explicable in these terms. For some individuals, or for
some individuals in some circumstances, there is a
reluctance to realign prior models based on experi-
ence. This is not just the reluctance that most people
have to move out of certain intellectual or habitual
comfort zones – the phenomena observed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) where people prefer their fast
thinking solutions even when they do not work very
well and lead to errors and mistakes. It is rather the
rigid adherence and attachment to models or ways of
thinking which produce frank discordance between
inner intra-individual processing and inter-individual
social processes. If this persists, it may engender a
form of model realignment, which is completely lop-
sided (Cameron, 1943; Lemert, 1962; May & Kelly,
1992). Also of course, there may be physical or phy-
siological reasons why the signals themselves coming
from the internal environment get distorted or the
mechanism for generating priors is in some way
faulty. In broad terms in both circumstances, psycho-
logical distress and social unease and discordance
may be the consequence, and the ensuing rigidities
and mismatches may generate what come to be seen
as mental health problems (Clark, 2016: 71–79).
Conclusion
George Herbert Mead’s major posthumous work was
called Mind Self and Society (Mead, 1934) and the title
of our paper reflects our debt to him. He set out to
show that conscious reasoning by the self was a
social process and that the self was itself social –
not a physical thing or a psychological trait, state or
conditioned response or reflex. Modern neuroscience
has hypothesised the intra-individual brain processes
by which the brain senses and intends action in a
modelled world. By introducing the social environ-
ments, we can hypothesise the way that inter-
individual processes may work in conjunction with
the intra-individual ones (Cacioppo & Cacioppo,
2013). We can go beyond for example accounts of
evolutionary psychology to demonstrate the impor-
tance of the social in this way; we can describe it in
the everyday lives of ordinary people.
The argument is that it is helpful to conceive of
human life as a process of continuous interaction
among and between individuals engaged in social
practices. They are knowledgeable about the practices
and their own experiences of them. People are able not
just to make sense of the world in a general sense
(Giddens, 1984 2–19) but also in ways which feed the
very processes of active inference through which pre-
dictive processing takes place. In other words, we might
think of the processes going on during predictive pro-
cessing as both individual and as relational/social
(Kriznik, Kinmonth, Ling, & Kelly, 2018). Typifications
are an emergent property of the interactions between
human agency and social structure and the interaction
between social practices and the physical and biologi-
cal environments that are ubiquitous to the human
condition (Kelly & Kelly, 2018). The physical sensations
of bodily experience as well as affective and subjective
feeling states arise in, and are part of, both the inter-
active processes between people and also the way that
they engage in the predictive processing they do. The
self is the bridge for these processes as Kant argued
more than two and a half centuries ago. It is clearly
important to understand the processes going on within
the individual as they engage in their predictive pro-
gramming – as Clark puts it the brain is an inner engine
of probabilistic prediction while predictive processing is
about how the process is done (Clark, 2016:28).
However, it is also helpful to think about the supra
individual level and the idea that the very tools which
are used in higher level predictive programming
emerge out of social interaction in environments
which are physical, biological and above all social
(Kelly, Kelly, & Russo, 2014).
The external environment and the way it interacts
with inter – individual processes is we suggest, as
important as the intra- individual processes themselves.
The external social and physical world is not just “there”
waiting to impact on inter-individual processing and
modelling either in a deterministic way or in a process
akin to osmosis. Humans actively engage with the
external world and in that engagement are constrained
by it in various ways. In elucidating those interactions it
is possible to describe the mechanisms linking inter and
intra individual processes. There are some very exciting
accounts of the intra individual processes developed by
the authors whose work has influenced this paper like
Seth, Frith, Pezzulo, and Clark. In these writings, there
are strong echoes of Schutzian phenomenology as well
as the interactionism of Mead and Blumer but without
reaching out explicitly to these ideas. This paper sug-
gests that these older thinkers’ contributions not only
resonate with the idea of the brain as a model of the
world, but they help to articulate how the brain
through social relationships is mediated by and in
turn acts upon the social world.
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It is our view that it is important to factor in the role
of the brain when thinking about social life. Ideal types
and typifications may be thought of as arising in social
interaction and as the distillation of the core models
used by humans for pragmatic simplification of the
complexities of the world as it is encountered. Ideal
types and typifications are the means of separating
the signal from the noise. They are adaptive because
they allow humans to share the models they have in
their heads about both what is subjective and what
they perceive and understand in the external world. In
the course of routine interaction, the models are
debated and disputed but they allow for and facilitate
human discourse and social action. They are adaptive
because they facilitate interaction with other brains.
Interaction with other brains is fundamental because
ambiguous sense data on its own does not generate
symmetry between different brains. The typifications
are the priors that facilitate intersubjectivity and prob-
ably make social life possible (Shook, 2013:37–8).
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